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General and complete disarmament

Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains views of Member States and relevant international organizations on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium. The Secretary-General has, to date, received 13 reports from Governments, in addition to responses from IAEA and WHO.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, by paragraph 2 of its resolution 63/54, invited Member States and relevant international organizations, particularly those that have not yet done so, to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on this subject to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

2. On 9 February 2010, a note verbale was sent to Member States requesting them to submit their reports by 1 June 2010. The Office for Disarmament Affairs also submitted a similar request to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

3. To date, the Secretary-General has received 13 replies from Governments, in addition to responses from IAEA and WHO. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Belgium

[Original: French]
[12 April 2010]

1. The Act of 11 May 2007 (published in the *Moniteur belge* of 20 June 2007), supplementing the Weapons Act of 8 June 2006, entered into force on 20 June 2009. This General Act states that no one shall "manufacture, repair, offer for sale, sell, transfer or transport these types of proscribed weapons, nor shall they keep such weapons in storage, in their possession or on their person", and inert munitions and armour plating containing depleted uranium or any other type of industrial uranium are now classified as proscribed weapons.

2. The prohibitions established by the Act are applicable not only to the State and the public authorities, but also to private actors. The Act also stipulates that existing stockpiles of depleted uranium in Belgium must be destroyed within three years from the publication of the Act in the *Moniteur belge*. It should be recalled that this Act, passed in 2007, was originally a parliamentary initiative. The Act entered into force two years after the day of its publication in the *Moniteur belge*, i.e. on 20 June 2009.

3. Parliamentary hearings with contributions by scientific experts were held before the Act was adopted. Various points of view were expressed regarding assessment of the risks to health and to the environment posed by the use of cluster munitions. Belgium is closely following all developments in the scientific analysis of the risks associated with the use of depleted uranium weapons systems, including studies conducted at the international level.

4. Belgium is thus the first country in the world to have implemented such a ban, which was imposed on the basis of the principles of caution and prudence.

5. Furthermore, a new Act prohibiting investment in the depleted uranium sector was enacted on 16 July 2009 (published in the *Moniteur belge* of 29 July 2009). This Act now prohibits banks and collective investments schemes holding financial instruments from granting loans to manufacturers of inert munitions and armour plating containing depleted uranium or any other type of industrial uranium.

6. In view of the ban on investment in the aforementioned proscribed weapons, the Belgian Parliament considered it logical to expand the specific ban on direct or indirect investment in companies that manufacture weapons containing depleted uranium, something which had not yet been done.

7. The relevant legislative text was adopted unanimously by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and its Senate. Belgium stands ready to provide the United Nations with any necessary clarification of the definitions, aims and modalities of the Belgian Act of 11 May 2007.

8. Belgium also expresses its readiness and, where appropriate, offers its expertise, to provide information requested by any interested State, particularly States in the process of establishing relevant legislation, on the basis of Belgian legislative experience.

9. Lastly, Belgium is open to any consultations deemed useful by other States that may have adopted comparable legislative bans, in order to explore opportunities to promote such a legislative approach at the international level.

Burundi

[Original: French]
[18 May 2010]

The use of depleted uranium in the manufacture of armaments and ammunitions

1. Depleted uranium is the waste or residue obtained from using enriched uranium in civil and military nuclear reactors. While depleted uranium is regarded as a waste product, it nevertheless maintains its radioactive properties.

2. It is also called "depleted" because it is 40 per cent less radioactive than natural uranium.

3. During the 1990s, researchers in the weapons industry discovered many advantages to using depleted uranium in the manufacture of armaments and ammunitions. First of all, as a waste, it is more cost-effective than other metals. Technically, depleted uranium is valuable because it can burn quickly at temperatures between 300 to 600 degrees Celsius and also because it is nearly twice as dense as lead. All of these properties of depleted uranium led to the manufacture of depleted uranium projectiles or penetrators whose main feature was the ability to pierce the armour plating of tanks and to destroy underground bunkers.

The use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium

4. The first use of depleted uranium armaments and ammunitions occurred in the Gulf War of 1991.* Each subsequent war, particularly in Bosnia, Kosovo,

* Translator's note: an entire line is missing from the French original.

Afghanistan and Iraq, was an opportunity for the major military Powers to test their new depleted uranium weapons.

Consequences of the use of depleted uranium ammunitions

5. Several international humanitarian organizations have conducted studies on the use of depleted uranium armaments, whether in combat zones or on soldiers involved in combat operations. These studies have concluded that depleted uranium contamination poisons the environment for several thousands of years and causes many cancers and other serious diseases among the affected population. It also causes terrible birth defects. It has been noted that the toxicity of depleted uranium becomes more dangerous when it takes the form of dust, which can be ingested or inhaled. In this form it can be easily carried by the wind and rain, and vast areas become contaminated.

6. This situation led to the emergence of the "International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons", which has even gone as far as proposing a resolution against the use of these armaments and ammunitions. All members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and all developing countries voted in favour of the resolution; however, the major nuclear Powers (including the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Israel and others) voted against it, arguing that the negative effects ascribed to depleted uranium had not been scientifically proven. The United Nations General Assembly therefore decided to defer the matter to its sixty-fifth session in order to give Member States and relevant organizations the time to express their supporting or opposing views on the use of depleted uranium armaments and ammunitions. This presupposes that the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other sufficiently competent bodies should be able to provide pertinent arguments on this matter. Similarly, the States that voted against the resolution should also submit evidence about the non-toxicity of depleted uranium.

7. It should be noted that while some military Powers do not wish to recognize the effects of depleted uranium officially at the international level, they recognize them socially at the national level by agreeing to compensate affected soldiers and their families. The decision not to recognize these effects may have been taken in order to avoid convictions, which even extends to compensating those directly or indirectly affected in their own countries.

8. Burundi wishes to incorporate the following observations in its views:

- Burundi has already voted against the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, and its position should remain unchanged at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly;
- Burundi does not have arms industries whose interests could be threatened by the prohibition of depleted uranium armaments and ammunitions;
- Burundi may not have the capacities to contribute to scientific research on this issue;
- The results of the studies already carried out remain relevant, despite being contested by the nuclear Powers.

9. In conclusion, Burundi would like to support the idea of prohibiting the manufacture and use of depleted uranium armaments and ammunitions.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[9 July 2010]

1. The wide margin of votes cast in favour of General Assembly resolution 63/54 clearly reaffirmed the broad and growing concern of the international community over the danger to human health and the environment from the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

2. The international campaign against the use of these types of arms has continued to gain momentum and parliaments around the world are approving measures every day to move towards a moratorium on their use.

3. The submissions transmitted to the United Nations Secretary-General from countries directly affected by such radioactive waste during armed conflict demonstrate that the use of depleted uranium can severely damage humanity. Independent studies and investigations conducted among affected populations, and the troops involved in military action in those areas, show an exponential increase in cases of cancer and other associated diseases, as well as in birth defects and other health conditions.

4. The information provided to the Secretary-General from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) confirms that the use of these arms has long-term detrimental effects. Furthermore, these organizations have recommended that monitoring systems should be established in the areas where these types of arms have been used in order to study their future effects; that monitoring and decontamination systems should be established in those areas; and that levels of public information should be increased. These appeals for caution confirm the validity of existing concerns.

5. It should be recalled that depleted uranium is included in the list of regulated nuclear material, including for its peaceful uses (article XX of the IAEA Statute). When this substance is used in armaments and ammunitions involved in armed conflict, it is "transferred" in violation of the requirements established by IAEA concerning its export and transfer and, additionally, without the consent of the recipient States.

6. In practice, depleted uranium is being used by some arms-manufacturing countries to circumvent international regulations and thereby to reduce their physical inventories of unwanted nuclear material.

7. It is contradictory that, while there are legally binding standards which regulate the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, including depleted uranium, there is no limit on the use of depleted uranium in the military sector, especially in cases when this material is used for offensive purposes as part of the strengthening of projectiles, bombs and missiles.

8. According to the Army Environmental Policy Institute of the United States of America, United States aircraft fired 940,000 depleted uranium projectiles over Iraq in Operation Desert Storm in 2003 alone, while 14,000 depleted uranium rounds were also used during the ground offensive. It is conservatively estimated that

between 300 and 800 tonnes of radioactive dust and particles were spread over land and water in the Middle East region alone.

9. Cuba reiterates the arguments previously transmitted to the Secretary-General, which were published in document A/63/170. Armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium constitute a threat to life and to the environment.

10. Until further research yields results, Cuba considers that the United Nations General Assembly should take the following steps:

- Request Member States that have used armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium in armed conflict to provide to the competent authorities of the countries affected, as a matter of urgency, comprehensive information about the location of the areas where they were used, and the quantities used, to facilitate the assessment, administration and clearance of the contaminated areas; and,
- Request Member States that have used armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium in armed conflict to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to the States and persons affected, including with a view to cleaning up the contaminated areas and promoting education in order to minimize risks.

Czech Republic

[Original: English]
[24 March 2010]

The Czech Republic does not possess any weapons, armaments or ammunition that contains depleted uranium and does not envisage acquiring any in the future. The Czech Republic closely follows studies concerning the use of depleted uranium and its effects, especially those undertaken within the United Nations system, e.g., by the World Health Organization, and it monitors conditions of the Czech Army personnel that may be deployed in international missions in areas where the use of depleted uranium could be suspected. Pending the existence of a clear and authoritative opinion on this matter, the Czech Republic reserves the right to form a definitive position on the issue of depleted uranium.

Ireland

[Original: English]
[26 August 2009]

1. In accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 63/54, Ireland submits its views to the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium. Ireland does not possess (and has never possessed) any weapons, armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

2. Ireland shares the concerns raised in the General Assembly about the potential risk related to the use of depleted uranium in armaments and ammunition. Ireland voted in favour of resolutions 62/30 and 63/54.

3. While there is no practical method of testing the people that may have been exposed to depleted uranium, thorough medical examinations are carried out on all Defence Forces personnel returning from deployment overseas. These include tests intended to detect signs of those diseases processes most likely to arise in case of contamination with depleted uranium. To date no evidence of an unusual incidence of disease has been found.

4. Ireland notes that, while a number of studies have been conducted by the relevant international organizational organizations, no definitive conclusion has been drawn on the potential adverse effects of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium on human health and the environment. Ireland will continue to closely monitor developments in the analysis of the risks associated with the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium and welcome the engagement of civil society, non-governmental organizations and the scientific community on this issue.

Japan

[Original: English]
[17 June 2010]

1. In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 63/54, entitled "Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium", adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2008, Japan submits its views to the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

2. Japan has neither owned nor used armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium. Japan recognizes that, despite the studies conducted by relevant international organizations on the effects of use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium on human health and the environment, at present no internationally definitive conclusion has been drawn. Japan will continue to follow carefully the developments of the studies conducted by the relevant international organizations.

3. Japan would like to call upon all relevant international organizations to conduct successive onsite studies and further information-gathering, including the latest scientific findings, with due attention to the opinions and activities of the interested NGOs in this field, and to provide their views on the effects that the use of depleted uranium munitions may/can cause on the human body and the environment. In this connection, Japan intends to continue to engage in dialogue, where appropriate, with civil society on this matter.

Jordan

[Original: Arabic]
[30 April 2010]

Depleted uranium

1. Introduction:

(a) Raw uranium contains about 0.71 per cent U-235, 99.28 per cent U-238, and some 0.0058 per cent U-234;

(b) The term "depleted uranium" is applied to uranium of which, during the enrichment process, the U-234 and U-235 content has been considerably reduced. U-235 is used to produce nuclear bombs and in nuclear reactors;

(c) After the enrichment process, depleted uranium contains 99.8 per cent U-238 and 0.2 per cent U-235. That material is readily useable for a variety of purposes.

2. Characteristics of depleted uranium:

(a) Its particles combust easily during friction or collision with a given body;

(b) Its density is 1.6 times higher than that of lead;

(c) Most of the energy emitted by uranium is in the form of alpha particles, albeit beta particles and gamma rays are by-products of the disintegration of atomic nuclei;

(d) Depleted uranium is silver in colour, but turns black, yellow or dark gold when exposed to air.

3. Health risks of depleted uranium:

(a) The principal health risk posed by depleted uranium is that, as a heavy metal, it is toxic. As happens with lead, another toxic heavy metal, when fragments of depleted uranium remain in the body, the kidneys are damaged, and all vital body functions are affected;

(b) Another hazard is that of ionization, particularly by alpha particles;

(c) The impact of depleted uranium depends on the way in which it enters the body;

(d) Particles of depleted uranium produced by the detonation of missiles armed with that material can dissolve in the blood. The kidneys are most susceptible to damage, but other parts of the body, including the bones, may also be affected. Depleted uranium can remain in the bones for a period of between 1,500 and 5,000 days;

(e) Some 60 per cent of uranium which does not dissolve in the blood and reaches the lungs is eliminated within 500 days;

(f) Current medical remedies are capable of alleviating the physiological impact of contamination with depleted uranium.

4. Indicators of the use of depleted uranium ammunition:

(a) It is easy to tell when an armoured vehicle has been hit by depleted uranium ammunition: the entry hole is small and the exit hole only slightly larger, whereas when conventional ammunition is used, both entry and exit holes are large. The most significant difference is that depleted uranium ammunition leaves nuclear residue which can be detected by using AN/VDR2, AN/PDR27 and AN/PDR77 radiac instruments. Conventional ammunition leaves no nuclear or radioactive residue;

(b) When depleted uranium combusts, particles of uranium oxide in the form of a heavy black dust arise within and around the vehicle and usually travel, with steady winds, to a distance of some 50 metres from the point of ignition.

5. Action to be taken in case of contamination by depleted uranium:

(a) In case of contamination by depleted uranium, the following measures should be taken:

(i) Removal to an area that is well away from any water source or place where food is stored;

(ii) Irradiated material on the person or on equipment should be brushed, wiped or washed;

(iii) Further contamination should be limited by dealing properly with the water used in the washing process;

(iv) Residue should be placed in a marked area or disposed of;

(v) A report in which the extent, type and level of nuclear contamination in the area is identified should be submitted to the supreme command;

(b) Should any depleted uranium be discovered on the ground, it should be covered, because it will emit alpha particles. Consequently, any barrier placed over the source will reduce risk.

6. Emergency first aid:

(a) When a victim is removed from a damaged or burned vehicle that is contaminated by depleted uranium, protective clothing and gloves should be worn and it should be established that there are no hazards, the most dangerous of which would be fire. Evacuation of victims, first aid and the necessary medical procedures should have priority over decontamination;

(b) Detection devices should be used in order to ascertain whether injuries are contaminated with depleted uranium or any other radioactive material;

(c) All wounds in the hands, arms, feet and legs that are suspected of being contaminated should be washed as soon as possible in order to remove any possible radioactive material;

(d) When there are multiple injuries, the emergency services should be contacted immediately and it should be indicated on the medical notes that the victim is contaminated by nuclear radiation. If possible, the decontamination process should be carried out without any negative impact on the victim.

7. The effect of radiation on the blood:

Red corpuscles are less affected because they contain a nucleus that can withstand up to 1,000 rem before their numbers are perceptibly reduced.

B and T white corpuscles are considered vulnerable to radiation because their numbers are considerably depleted when exposed to only a few hundred rem. It takes the body several weeks to restore levels to what they were before the radiation incident. Blood platelets are similar to white corpuscles in the way they are affected.

8. The effect of radiation on the digestive system:

(a) The mouth and pharynx are less sensitive to radiation, while the stomach is more sensitive, because the cells that excrete hydrochloric acid and pepsin stop doing so when exposed to a few hundred rem;

(b) The small intestine is the part of the digestive system that is most vulnerable to radiation: exposure to a few hundred rem halts the production of the cells that line the small intestine and thus destroy it from within. Blood and plasma pour into the digestive tract, the microbes that are in that tract are transferred to the blood and spread to all parts of the body, leading to death.

9. The effect of radiation on chromosomes:

Each cell of a human body contains 46 chromosomes that carry all a person's genetic information. One hundred rad is sufficient to mutate chromosomes in a way that differs from the mutation caused by burns or chemical materials. A chromosome is capable of rectifying a mutation caused by up to 1,000 rad before it is completely destroyed.

10. The effect of radiation on the nervous system:

Exposure to more than 5,000 rem destroys the nerve signals that control such sensitive organs as the brain and the heart and thus leads to death.

11. The effect of radiation on the reproductive system:

Radiation affects the cells that produce semen in the male. Exposure to 250 rem will lead to sterility that will last for one year, while exposure to between 500 and 600 rem will cause sterility for between one and three years. Permanent sterility can be caused by exposure to between 300 and 600 rem.

12. Jordan does not possess any arms or ammunition of which depleted uranium is a component and is of the view that the use of such weapons pose grave risks to human beings, all living things and the environment.

Lithuania

[Original: English]
[17 May 2010]

1. There is no data so far with regard to the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium in the territory of Lithuania.

2. Nevertheless, Lithuania takes into account the results of the numerous research works conducted worldwide providing data on the potential chemical and radiological toxicity of the depleted uranium and understands the threats, hazards

and consequences of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium. Therefore, Lithuania supports the approach of suspending the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium until the results of the comprehensive study of hazards and health effects from depleted uranium become available.

3. However, the regulatory control and assessment of the benefit and detriment of the use of depleted uranium for military purposes due to restrictions applied and insufficient research data remain a complex task and require further civil and military consideration and analysis.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[3 June 2010]

1. The views of the Government of Mexico on this issue are given below pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/54, entitled "Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium", adopted on 2 December 2008.

2. The studies on soil, water and food conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see document A/63/170) have demonstrated that the use of this type of ammunition has minimal effects on the level of contamination of those elements in affected areas. No significant deformities or diseases have arisen from exposure of the general public to depleted uranium in the areas where such ammunition has been used. The use of depleted uranium therefore does not pose a radiological hazard to the population of affected areas.

3. While it is true that the public health risk arising from the use of this type of ammunition is minimal, it is also true that civilian populations in post-conflict situations consider remnants of depleted uranium on their land to be a threat.

4. Mexico believes that the use of radioactive material should be limited to peaceful purposes, such as activities relating to industry, health, research and the production of electricity, so as to avoid any use of nuclear material for weapons purposes.

5. For its part, Mexico is not researching the impact of the use of depleted uranium on human health or on the environment. Furthermore, Mexico is not using this material for the manufacture of armaments and ammunitions. However, it wishes to state the following:

(a) Uranium is a naturally occurring element used, among other things, in the generation of nuclear power. Depleted uranium is a by-product of the process of uranium enrichment in the nuclear power industry. Thus, depleted uranium is almost entirely U-238 and is about 60 per cent as radioactive as natural uranium;

(b) Chemically, physically and toxicologically, depleted uranium behaves in the same way as the metallic form of natural uranium;

(c) Peaceful uses of depleted uranium include counterweights in aeroplanes, and shields against radiation in medical radiotherapy units and transport of radioactive isotopes. Thus, depleted uranium is a dual-use product, used both in the nuclear industry and in other industries;

(d) Depleted uranium is used for heavy tank armour, anti-tank munitions, missiles and projectiles because of its high density and melting point, and easy availability. Depleted uranium weapons are regarded as conventional weapons and are used freely by armed forces;

(e) The health effects of depleted uranium depend on the route and magnitude of exposure (ingestion, inhalation, contact or in wounds), the characteristics of the depleted uranium (particle size and solubility) and the setting where it is used (military, civil, occupational);

(f) Mexico encourages WHO to continue studying the effects of low-level exposure from the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

Netherlands

[Original: English]
[23 June 2010]

1. The Netherlands voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 63/54, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek views of Member States and relevant international organizations on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

2. The Netherlands recognizes the need for additional research of the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium and appreciates that this issue is being discussed in the forum of the United Nations. However, the reference in the resolution to the "potential" harmful effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions on human health and the environment cannot so far be substantiated by scientific studies conducted by relevant international organizations such as WHO.

3. The Dutch armed forces do not use munitions containing depleted uranium. In the context of multinational missions, however, it is not impossible that Dutch service personnel may operate in areas in which munitions containing depleted uranium are being or have been used by allies. The health and well-being of Dutch soldiers deployed on international missions is under the continuous scrutiny of the Dutch Government. Exposure to hazardous materials must be avoided to the greatest possible extent.

New Zealand

[Original: English]
[1 June 2010]

1. New Zealand does not possess stockpiles of depleted uranium armaments or munitions.

2. When New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel are deployed into operational areas where depleted uranium (DU) munitions may have been used, more stringent health monitoring has been undertaken on these personnel. To date no adverse health effects linked to DU have been identified in NZDF personnel.

3. New Zealand is following closely studies by international agencies on the potential health impacts of DU. The Government (through the NZDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)) will continue to monitor international developments, reports and studies on DU and potential health impacts.

Norway

[Original: English]
[7 June 2010]

1. Norway affirms its support for General Assembly resolution 63/54, entitled "Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium". In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 5 of the resolution, Norway is pleased to offer its views on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.

2. Norway has never possessed any ammunition containing depleted uranium. Norway takes note of reports by the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which so far have concluded that, according to available information, the harmful effects of depleted uranium to human health will be limited except under very special circumstances. The reports underline, however, that the long-term effects from the use of depleted uranium ammunition, including also for the environment, must be monitored and examined further.

3. Norway therefore welcomes continued work by WHO, IAEA and UNEP in this area. Norway also welcomes the increased involvement of civil society regarding this issue and has allocated some US$ 100,000 to fund a research project by the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW) examining possible long-term effects of depleted uranium ammunition.

4. Norway will continue to cooperate closely with international partners in establishing the extent to which depleted uranium ammunition has harmful effects on human health or environment.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[21 June 2010]

1. As a member of the United Nations, the Republic of Panama is concerned by the use of conventional weapons containing depleted uranium and the ensuing repercussions for human health.

2. Accordingly, it believes that laws of war exist which prohibit the use of deadly and inhumane weapons away from the battlefield, or the use of weapons of war whose effects continue once a conflict has ended.

3. In accordance with the international treaties ratified by Panama, States have a duty to protect civilian persons in time of war or to prohibit the use of weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

4. A full clean-up operation must therefore be carried out on board radioactively contaminated vessels where depleted uranium has been used, in order to protect the health of children and adults and to prevent environmental contamination.

5. Panama urges United Nations Member States to comply with the treaties ratified, to implement human protection standards and to use uranium only for globally accepted civilian purposes.

III. Replies received from agencies and organs of the United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

[Original: English]
[15 June 2010]

1. Depleted uranium (DU) is one of the by-products of uranium enrichment and, like any other uranium compound, has both chemical and radiological toxicity. DU is only slightly radioactive, 60 per cent as radioactive as natural uranium. DU has the same chemical and physical properties as natural uranium. The chemical toxicity of uranium is normally the dominant factor for human health. However, in special circumstances in which DU was inhaled or ingested or where fragments came into close contact with individuals, it is necessary to also assess its radiological impact.

2. After the use of DU in conventional anti-tank munitions during conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East, questions arose regarding the possible consequences of the existence of DU residues for local populations and the environment. As part of the United Nations system's effort to response to the requests of affected States to assess the consequences of the use of DU ammunitions in conflict situations, IAEA, with its unique statutory functions, i.e., to establish standards of safety for protection against radiation exposure and to provide for the application of these standards, has been involved in coordinated evaluation exercises.

3. A number of evaluations of the environmental and health impact of DU munitions have been performed by national and international organizations. IAEA participated together with UNEP and WHO in several international appraisals like

those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon. The radiological framework for these studies was the *International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources*[1] and the methodology was generally based on sampling campaigns, analyses of the environmental samples in recognized international laboratories and radiological assessments performed by international experts.

4. The objectives of these assessments have been to draw conclusions regarding the toxic and radiological safety and to make recommendations to mitigate the hazards to the population and the environment, on the basis of comprehensive surveys at specific locations where depleted uranium ammunition residues may have been spread. These studies exclusively dealt with civilian inhabitants and environmental radiological risk in areas affected by military actions after the conflicts were terminated. The results and conclusions are valid at the time of the assessments and, when possible and under certain grounds, prospectively. IAEA did not evaluate the impact of DU ammunition to the troops or the populations at the time of the conflicts.

5. In general, the results of these assessments indicated that the existence of DU residues dispersed in the environment does not pose a radiological hazard to the population of the affected regions. Estimated annual radiation doses that could arise from exposure to DU residues would be very low and of little radiological concern. Annual radiation doses in the areas where residues do exist would be of the order of a few microsieverts, well below the annual doses received by the population from the natural sources of radiation in the environment and far below the reference level recommended by IAEA as a radiological criterion to help establish whether remedial actions are necessary.

6. Complete DU ammunition or fragments can still be found at some locations where DU weapons were used during past wars. Prolonged skin contact with these DU residues is the only possible exposure pathway that could result in exposures of radiological significance. As long as access to the areas where these fragments exist remains restricted, the likelihood that members of the public could come into contact with these residues is low. The recommendations to the national authorities, in all the cases studied where to collect any DU ammunition or fragments and any war equipment which have been in direct contact with these ammunitions and isolate them from the public in appropriate locations until it can be processed as low level radioactive waste and eventually safety disposed of. Some environmental remedial actions like covering of areas with uncontaminated soils could be convenient at some particular locations, depending on the use of the land.

7. In 2010 IAEA published the report *Radiological Conditions at Selected Areas of Southern Iraq with Residues of Depleted Uranium*,[2] which provides the results of a radiological assessment conducted in Southern Iraq by IAEA in cooperation with

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[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Labour Organization, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Pan American Health Organization, World Health Organization, *International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources*, Safety Series No. 115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).

[2] International Atomic Energy Agency, *Radiological Conditions at Selected Areas of Southern Iraq with Residues of Depleted Uranium*, Radiological Assessment Reports Series, IAEA, Vienna, May 2010.

UNEP and the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of the Environment. The results in this report are conclusive that the radiation doses from DU dispersed in the environment do not pose a radiological hazard to the populations at the four locations studied. The report also provides recommendations for the safe management of the fragments of DU which can be found in the region and, moreover, on the activities related to metal recycling of the abandoned military vehicles and armoured war tanks that could contain DU residues.

8. After the conclusion of the investigations in which IAEA participated, the national authorities in the affected regions should have had the competence and equipment to carry out the necessary monitoring, survey and remedial activities in relation to DU. This was actually observed in all the cases studied.

9. IAEA, together with UNEP and WHO, provided a coordinated response to the request of its member States to assess the post-conflict radiological risk to the public and the environment from the contamination of territories with DU residues. IAEA generally concluded that the radiological risk was not significant and could be controlled with simple countermeasures conducted by national authorities. It was also observed that in a post-conflict environment where the social and economic disruption is high, the radiation fear linked to the presence of DU residues further increases the anxiety of the population. In many of the concerned countries the results of the radiological evaluations provided a basis for public reassurance due to the low significance of the radiological impact.

World Health Organization (WHO)

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[5 June 2010]

1. WHO has been cooperating on the topic of depleted uranium (DU) with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the assessment of potential impact of DU in post-conflict areas; for example, in Bosnia and Kuwait. Earlier reports of the international organizations focused on environmental and health impact of depleted uranium. Depleted uranium concentration levels in soil exceeding background levels of uranium was reported close to locations of depleted uranium shrapnel or remains of tanks left after military operations. Over time, the depleted uranium concentration is dispersed into the wider natural environment by wind and rain. People living or working in affected areas may inhale re-suspended contaminated dusts.

2. In 2005-2006, following the request of Iraqi national authorities, WHO participated in UNEP-led capacity-building effort for Iraqi specialists that included training and workshops held in Amman and Geneva on assessment and management of environmental DU exposure (see UNEP, Technical Report on Capacity-building for the Assessment of Depleted Uranium in Iraq (Geneva, 2007)).

3. Over the last decade, the World Health Organization (WHO) has developed comprehensive information material regarding the assessment of potential health effects of environmental DU in post-conflict areas. Guidance on sources and effects of DU was developed for medical doctors and programme administrators, in collaboration with the United Nations Joint Medical Staff (see http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/en/Recommend_Med_Officers_final.pdf) in 2001. WHO also produced a

report in 2001 entitled *Depleted uranium: sources, exposure and health effects* (see http://whqlibdoc.int/hq/2001/WHO_SDE_PHE_01.1.pdf).

4. As an update to the 2001 report, a review of the most recent scientific evidence on health risks from various DU exposure situations was conducted over the last two years (2008-2009). This material is currently under review before publication. Recent epidemiological studies have not offered new evidence regarding health effects of human exposures to DU.

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Follow-up to and implementation of the outcome of the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development and the 2008 Review Conference

Summary by the President of the General Assembly of the fourth High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development (New York, 23 and 24 March 2010)

I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly held its fourth High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development on 23 and 24 March 2010 at United Nations Headquarters. The overall theme of the meeting was "The Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: status of implementation and tasks ahead".

2. The President of the General Assembly, Ali Abdussalam Treki, opened the meeting. Statements were made by the Secretary-General and the representatives of major institutional stakeholders, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization. One Prime Minister, two ministers, six vice-ministers and many high-level officials from 67 Governments made statements to the plenary, including seven representatives speaking on behalf of groups of countries. The second day was devoted to three interactive multi-stakeholder round tables on selected themes, each followed by an informal interactive dialogue. Participants at those informal meetings included high-level representatives of Governments, 22 representatives of international organizations and observers, and 24 representatives of civil society organizations and the private sector.

3. The titles of the round tables and the informal interactive dialogue were as follows:

- Round table 1: The reform of the international monetary and financial system and its implications for development.

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- Round table 2: The impact of the current financial and economic crisis on foreign direct investment and other private flows, external debt and international trade.
- Round table 3: The role of financial and technical development cooperation, including innovative sources of development finance, in leveraging the mobilization of domestic and international financial resources for development.
- Informal interactive dialogue: The link between financing for development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals: the road to the 2010 high-level event.

4. The meeting had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up to and implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development (A/64/322) and the progress report of the Secretary-General on innovative sources of development finance (A/64/189 and Corr.1). The discussions held at the plenary meetings, round tables and interactive dialogue meetings are summarized below.

II. Plenary meetings

5. The President of the General Assembly opened the meeting by emphasizing that the current priority of developed and developing countries was to ensure a sustainable economic recovery from the world financial and economic crisis. In particular, developing countries continued to pay a heavy price for a crisis that was not of their making. It was thus crucial to increase the quality and quantity of aid, resist protectionist measures in international trade and arrive at a development-oriented conclusion to the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Moreover, international measures should ensure that developing economies, which had benefited from debt relief initiatives, did not fall back into debt distress because of the crisis.

6. According to the speaker, the crisis had revealed fundamental weaknesses in global economic governance. More regulation and enhanced oversight of financial markets, as well as reform of the governance of the international financial institutions, including an increase in the voice and participation of developing countries, were essential. The High-level Dialogue provided an important opportunity to review and mobilize policy actions towards addressing the challenges faced by developing countries, within the framework of the commitments contained in the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development.

7. In his opening address, the Secretary-General pointed to the high human cost of the financial crisis as the world economy began its fragile recovery. He stressed that much more needed to be done by donors and international institutions to mitigate the suffering of the most vulnerable people. He recalled that the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, held in June 2009, had emphasized that short-term responses to the crisis must be in harmony with longer-term development goals. Thus, the nine joint crisis initiatives, established by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, included immediate steps to address the impact of the economic

downturn as well as longer-term measures to generate decent work and lead to more equitable and sustainable development.

8. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals must remain at the top of the United Nations agenda, particularly in the period leading to the summit on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2010, which should decide on a plan of action to meet the 2015 deadline. The Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development provided the framework for a true global partnership for development needed to reach the Millennium Development Goals through a combination of nationally owned development strategies, investment, trade, aid, debt relief and global economic governance reforms.

9. The Vice-President and Head of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network of the World Bank, Otaviano Canuto, reflecting on the impact of the crisis, noted that even mild downturns could produce costly and long-lasting social effects since families with few alternative employment opportunities and little access to credit were frequently forced to reduce food intake or take children out of school. The World Bank's crisis response included, inter alia, mobilizing $87.6 billion in cumulative financial commitments during the period from 1 July 2008 to 31 December 2009. Those commitments were likely to surpass $100 billion by the end of April 2010. The crisis response efforts of the Bank were accompanied by extensive work to modernize its corporate governance and enhance the voice of transition and developing economies in decision-making. Development aid, debt relief and multilateral assistance offered opportunities for high-return investments, which in turn would help to rebalance the world economy towards a more sustainable and development-oriented growth pattern in the long term. According to the speaker, the mutual accountability framework enshrined in the Monterrey Consensus provided a solid foundation on which to build a more comprehensive framework to address global issues and reach the Millennium Development Goals.

10. The Associate Administrator of UNDP, Rebeca Grynspan, highlighted the fact that developing countries were faced with painful choices, as the need for service delivery increased and available funds dwindled. Increasing the quality and quantity of aid was crucial to avoid the dire long-term effects of service cuts in essential areas like education and to ensure the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Development assistance would have to be mobilized quickly for both the short- and long-term development needs. The speaker called for more progress on commitments to untie aid and improve mutual accountability and transparency in order to deliver unconditional and predictable finance for development. Traditional official development assistance (ODA) could be complemented by innovative sources of development finance, such as the International Finance Facility for Immunization and levies on airline tickets to finance HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria treatments.

11. The speaker called for building climate-change risk into ODA since, according to some estimates, 40 per cent of development investment funded by ODA and concessional lending was subject to climate risk. Developmental and environmental challenges must be tackled together to ensure policy coherence. More attention should be directed at reducing the debt burdens of low- and middle-income countries excluded from international debt relief schemes. In addition, financial inclusion should be enhanced to increase access to financial services for both potential savers and potential borrowers.

12. The Deputy Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Petko Draganov, emphasized that it was vital to refocus financial activities on catalysing physical and human investments and job creation based on the decent work principle in developing countries. For sustainable development, well-developed and diverse production capacities were essential, particularly for the least developed countries. Investments in physical and social infrastructure would also help to provide the necessary conditions for private investment.

13. The speaker recommended that Governments establish regulatory and macroeconomic frameworks that discouraged undesirable capital inflows and channelled resources towards productive investment. He further welcomed recent reform efforts within multilateral financial bodies that helped to rebalance decision-making power in the Bretton Woods institutions. Post-crisis measures by the international community had increased the financing capacity of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The speaker cautioned, however, that new resources should be carefully targeted at countries in need, without reverting to counterproductive policy prescriptions or onerous conditionalities. In this connection, the recent allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) based on existing quotas was somewhat misguided, as it resulted in directing the bulk of the resources to developed countries.

14. The Director of the Development Division of the World Trade Organization, Shishir Priyadarshi, emphasized that the economic downturn resulting from the world financial and economic crisis had affected all sectors of the world economy. The multilateral trading system had resisted drastic increase in protectionist measures and helped to steer the world economic system back to a fragile path to recovery. The successful, development-oriented conclusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was essential for developing countries, which should mainstream trade into their development plans.

15. The speaker called for significant increases in aid for trade to allow developing countries to harvest the potential benefits from increased market access that would result from the successful conclusion of the Doha Round. This would foster development through trade and achieve a more equitable and development-friendly global economic order. Whereas recent efforts to mobilize resources for aid for trade had been successful, it was important to look at the challenges ahead, including increased pressure on donor countries and the uneven recovery of countries from the recent financial crisis.

16. Most speakers in the plenary addressed the issue of the reform of global economic governance with a view to increasing the voice and participation of developing and transition economies to reflect the changing world economy. It was pointed out that the "voice reform" of the Bretton Woods institutions, which was currently on the agenda, was not sufficient and some speakers specifically called for the expanded participation of African countries in those institutions, in ad hoc groups, such as the G-20, and in the norm-setting bodies. One speaker, representing a large group of countries, reiterated the view that the increase in quotas for developing countries should be no less than 7 per cent. Some speakers noted that enhanced representation of developing and transition economies in existing international institutions and arrangements would help to promote the legitimacy of those institutions and their decisions.

17. Many speakers called for strengthening the role of the United Nations in global economic governance and for greater use of the General Assembly as a natural forum for discussions on the macroeconomic issues and for the coordination of international development agendas and decision-making processes. This would require enhanced coordination and coherence within the United Nations and between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization. Several speakers recalled the ad hoc open-ended working group of the General Assembly mandated to follow up on the issues contained in the Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development. There should also be a role for regional and subregional organizations in ensuring policy coordination.

18. There was general agreement among speakers that mobilization of domestic resources was the primary source of finance for development. A number of speakers emphasized that, in order to implement policies needed to achieve that mobilization, developing countries needed sufficient policy space. Some speakers expressed preference for channelling development assistance through budget support. The need for fiscal reform was also underlined, including the broadening of the tax base, reform of tax administration and strengthening capacity to fight tax evasion. In this regard, the need for increasing international cooperation was stressed. A few speakers viewed the private sector as the driver of sustainable development and emphasized the need for an enabling environment for private investment, both domestic and foreign. Some speakers called for support to the public-private partnerships and corporate responsibility, noting that the Global Compact offered a solid and dynamic framework for leveraging the private sector.

19. Many speakers noted that it was necessary to mobilize a full range of international financing to supplement domestic resources. A number of speakers underlined the link between financing for development and the Millennium Development Goals, especially Goal 8. It was noted that the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development had called for mobilizing resources for development to achieve the internationally agreed development goals, through a longer-term strategy of development cooperation, which would take into account market access, technology transfer, food security, external debt and financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

20. In this regard, it was recognized that the conditions of countries with special needs, including the least developed countries, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries and countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, should be addressed and their needs should be placed high on the international development agenda. The importance and urgency of building capacities for long-term resiliency to economic shocks, natural disasters and climate change, especially in the most vulnerable countries, were also recognized. Moreover, it was important, according to some speakers, to focus on a coherent G-20 agenda that would follow up on commitments undertaken to foster economic recovery and strong, sustainable and balanced growth, to honour aid commitments and to explore new financing mechanisms and partnerships.

21. Almost all speakers called for the outcome of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations to deliver on its development agenda and to use trade as a tool to promote sustainable development. Increased market access and reduced agricultural subsidies, taking into consideration the special needs of developing countries, would

have greatly contributed to financing for development. Some speakers called on developed countries to resist the temptation to resort to protectionist measures and to make efforts to improve the effective participation of commodity producers in the global trade.

22. A number of speakers emphasized that developing countries needed an enabling policy environment and appropriate regulatory mechanisms for attracting foreign investment for the development of productive capacities. Some speakers noted that foreign direct investment (FDI) could be especially beneficial in this regard and needed to be channelled to low-income countries through international cooperation in the use of risk-mitigation and guarantee mechanisms.

23. Most speakers stressed the need for developed countries to honour their ODA commitments, including the Gleneagles commitment to double ODA to African countries by 2010. There was a call for an expeditious decision during the next session of the General Assembly, in the context of the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, to establish a monitoring mechanism for all ODA commitments made to Africa. Improving aid effectiveness, while observing the principle of national ownership, was reiterated as a complementary objective to delivering on ODA commitments. While recognizing the importance of effective and efficiently delivered aid, a number of participants recognized that a set of coherent national and international policies was of equal importance to achieve sustainable development.

24. The importance of innovative sources of financing in supplementing traditional development assistance was noted. Some speakers expressed support for initiatives involving voluntary contributions and highlighted their value in targeting the specific needs of developing countries. One speaker focused on a specific initiative, by which proceeds from the auction of emission allowances could be used to finance climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries. Another speaker representing a group of countries called for a follow-up to paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 64/193 on financing for development, in which the Assembly called for an informal event on the potential of voluntary innovative sources of development finance, and offered support for holding such an event in preparation for the summit on the Millennium Development Goals.

25. Many speakers called for a just, lasting and development-oriented solution to the external indebtedness of developing countries to free up resources for development. Particular attention was paid to a number of countries whose economies relied on foreign-exchange-generating sectors such as tourism, which had been hit hard by the financial crisis and which experienced serious difficulties in servicing their external debt. The economic hardship had slowed their progress towards attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, directly affecting the food and energy supply. The view was expressed that, for those and other poorest countries, all debt relief options should be urgently considered, including debt cancellation and long-term debt relief without conditionalities. Some delegations expressed the view that highly indebted middle-income countries that were also vulnerable to external shocks should be granted access to concessionary loans and financing from international financial institutions.

26. Some speakers lamented the erosion of the financing for development commitments and called for continued work to strengthen the follow-up mechanism,

in accordance with the Monterrey commitment to "staying engaged". This would require stronger engagement of major institutional stakeholders beyond the official meetings. It was also pointed out that there was some convergence between the financing for development follow-up process and that of the Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development. It was therefore important to address both processes from the perspective of financing for development. A number of speakers stressed the need to ensure that the main conclusions of the High-level Dialogue would provide an input to the consultative process for the September summit on the Millennium Development Goals.

III. Round table 1. The reform of the international monetary and financial system and its implications for development

27. Following opening remarks by the Chairperson, Gert Rosenthal, Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations, round table 1 featured three presentations, by José Antonio Ocampo, Professor in the Professional Practice of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University; Ranjit Teja, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Policy and Review Department of IMF; and Martin Khor, Executive Director of the South Centre.

Presentations by the panellists

28. Mr. Ocampo expressed the view that the United Nations should play a greater role in dialogues on world economic and financial issues. He stressed that the reform of the international financial system should focus on three sets of topics, namely, financial regulation, deep reform of IMF and the creation of a sovereign debt resolution mechanism. The reform agenda in the area of financial regulation should include regulation of capital accounts. This was particularly important for developing countries, which, thanks to their comparatively higher interest rates, attracted short-term capital, which could not be productively absorbed by them. As for IMF, it should become the primary organ for economic policy coordination, promote the use of SDRs and make its lending more automatic, predictable and with fewer or no conditions attached. The world also needed an international mechanism for sovereign and, probably, some private cross-border debt workouts. Such a mechanism, which had yet to be created, was indispensable for the orderly and timely resolution of debt crises.

29. Mr. Teja (IMF) discussed three broad issues in the IMF governance reform and mandate, namely, its governance structure, policy coordination and surveillance function and lending operations. The issue of governance was very important for the legitimacy of the Fund. In addition to re-alignment of quota in favour of developing countries, it involved the composition of the Board, as well as the process of management selection and staff diversity. An enhanced role in policy coordination would require high-level engagement via a reformed International Monetary and Financial Committee or some new organ. To strengthen its surveillance function, the Fund was placing more emphasis on the monitoring of developed and large emerging economies as well as financial markets. More attention was also paid to the implications of country policies for the rest of the world. Besides, IMF had become more active in dealing with the issue of capital flows, including through

collaboration with member countries on the feasibility of capital controls. The Fund was looking for further adjustments to its lending tool kit to make liquidity provision more automatic, predictable and significant.

30. In his presentation, Mr. Khor (South Centre) pointed out that the main lesson of the recent crisis was that finance should serve the needs of the real economy and, in the case of developing countries, the needs of development. Restoring finance, which had been too volatile and speculative, to its proper role required much more effective and strict regulation. In this regard, there was a need for reform of financial institutions. It was important that commercial banks concentrated on deposit and loan activities, rather than on proprietary trading. This should be done internationally, including in developing countries, to avoid regulatory arbitrage. Another important task was re-regulation of cross-border capital flows to discourage speculation. Accordingly, the role of capital controls should be re-examined and included in the reform agenda. In addition, the feasibility of the introduction of a tax on international transactions should be further explored. According to the panellist, the adjustment of trade imbalances required the redistribution of global demand. National policies should address problems of overconsumption in the United States and underconsumption in surplus countries, including not only China but also Germany and Japan.

Discussion

31. During the interactive exchange of views that followed, most speakers underlined an urgent need to strengthen global economic governance. It was noted that the United Nations was a unique forum for consensus-building; accordingly, its role and relevance in discussing global economic and financial issues should be strengthened. The view was expressed that the Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development had represented a good example of successful consensus-building at the United Nations on international economic and financial issues. Therefore, there was a need for a strong follow-up mechanism to the Conference. Participants also referred to the need to establish closer links between the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. The Bretton Woods institutions should fully participate in the United Nations intergovernmental process as members of the United Nations system.

32. At the same time, it was pointed out that it had thus far been quite difficult at the United Nations to move beyond discussions and to reach agreements, while the G-20 had emerged as a force capable of bringing on change. In view of the importance of enhanced macroeconomic and financial policy coordination, the decision to use the G-20 for these purposes was seen as a positive development. However, according to some speakers, a much better solution would be to assign this function to a representative organization, such as IMF. Several speakers stressed the importance of making the roles of the G-20 and the United Nations complementary. The G-20 should be supported by a number of United Nations organizations.

33. While discussing the reform of the international financial institutions, some speakers were of the view that there should be no veto in any of those institutions. Moreover, to ensure the direct or indirect representation of every country, the global economic governance bodies should have at least a constituency system, like IMF and the World Bank. Several participants called for the creation of a new global

regulatory mechanism. The need for a more democratic Financial Stability Board as well as more involvement of the United Nations was emphasized.

34. Many participants stressed that, despite recent important and positive changes, IMF lending could be further improved to make it more attractive to members. The policy on conditionality of lending should be further reviewed to make it less intrusive. It was noted also that the neo-liberal paradigm did not work and that developing countries should have appropriate policy space to take counter-cyclical measures and pursue nationally owned development strategies. Besides, IMF should collaborate more closely with regional monetary institutions.

35. Several speakers highlighted the importance of the reform of the global reserve system while also acknowledging that this was a longer-term process. It was suggested that the role of SDRs should be significantly increased, including their use for development purposes. Some speakers focused attention on the need to ease the developing country debt burden and to develop a mechanism for sovereign debt workouts. Several participants urged further consideration of existing proposals on these issues, including a moratorium on debt payments as well as the creation of a debt arbitration centre or an international bankruptcy court.

IV. Round table 2. The impact of the current financial and economic crisis on foreign direct investment and other private flows, external debt and international trade

36. In her opening remarks, the Chairperson of round table 2, Olga Algayerova, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, noted that the past two years had seen a succession of global crises, which had affected advanced, emerging and developing countries alike. Depending on the degree of vulnerability to external economic shocks, the crises had the potential to seriously affect development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The round table featured two panellists, Daniel Titelman, Director of the Development Studies Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), who participated on behalf of the regional commissions, and Heiner Flassbeck, Director of the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies of UNCTAD.

Presentations by the panellists

37. Mr. Titelman (ECLAC) reflected on the impact of the recent crisis on global economic activity, including the severe effects on developing countries, inter alia through rises in unemployment. However, various developing countries and regions had been affected with different intensity and by different factors, which needed to be taken into account in evaluating the crisis and in fashioning ways of addressing its impact and preventing reoccurrences. Not all developing economies had the financial and fiscal capacity to mitigate the economic and social effects of the crisis, *and to stimulate aggregate demand* in particular. Moreover, many developing economies did not have the necessary productive capacity and production specialization to take advantage of the recovery in international trade.

38. In terms of recovery, according to the speaker, developing economies would grow faster than developed ones and some of them were expected to become the

engines of global growth. The main challenge of the post-crisis era was to avoid the mistakes of the past, namely the concentration of international financial resources in a small group of developing countries and a small group of productive sectors. The speaker also noted the need for a deep reform of the international financial architecture; the adoption of counter-cyclical policies to address the erratic behaviour of international financial markets; and greater global, regional and subregional coordination to develop early warning systems to avoid future crises, to establish new regulation and supervision schemes, and to coordinate policies with a view to increasing the level and efficiency of ODA. Regarding the early warning system, a panel of internationally renowned independent experts was one possibility. Factors like the surges in short-term unproductive and volatile flows into a number of emerging economies with high interest rates and the increasing role of speculation in driving commodity prices had been increasingly evident during the pre-crisis period and in the future could serve as warning signs.

39. Mr. Flassbeck (UNCTAD) underlined the need to evaluate the recent crisis in a holistic fashion and to analyse what could have been done in terms of economic policy to avoid it. He observed the danger that Governments' attempts to exit from the current high fiscal deficits could be accompanied by cuts in ODA, which would send a negative signal for development. According to the speaker, in response to the crisis there was an urgent need for serious discussion on the new international financial architecture, including the global monetary system. In the long term, the only way forward was for currency valuation to be less driven by speculators, because currency floats had not exposed countries to sudden shocks. In addition, it was necessary to consider a new regime for dealing with volatile commodity prices. The importance of reaching an appropriate balance between economic stability and development was noted, and this entailed considering the adoption of counter-cyclical policies and instruments, as well as measures such as a tax on international currency transactions and national capital controls.

40. Turning to trade, the speaker stressed the need to finalize the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. He pointed out, however, that the crisis had changed the relative prices in the global economy dramatically and that therefore all calculations and assessments of the benefits to be derived from a certain set of arrangements, such as the conclusion of the Doha Round, needed to be re-evaluated. The international community had to take a step back and rethink the entire development strategy, by considering all of its interconnected aspects, instead of just focusing on trade or capital flows.

Discussion

41. During the ensuing discussion, several speakers agreed that the nature and intensity of the crisis, and the speed and strength of the subsequent recovery, had varied and would continue to vary between different regions and countries, as well as between different types of financial and trade flows. This needed to be factored in when attempting to mitigate the impact of the crisis, dealing with the post-crisis world and seeking to prevent reoccurrences in the future. Some participants expressed concern that, even if an early warning system was developed, a challenge remained of how to ensure that it was listened and responded to.

42. Several participants stressed the need to address the plight of many middle-income countries, which were vulnerable to the effects of the crisis and were highly

indebted, yet lacked proper access to concessional finance. Other participants pointed to the role of women, who had been severely affected by the crisis, yet were a key to recovery, in mitigating the effects of the crisis and preventing reoccurrences in the future.

V. Round table 3. The role of financial and technical development cooperation, including innovative sources of development finance, in leveraging the mobilization of domestic and international financial resources for development

43. Following opening remarks by the Chairperson, João Gomes Cravinho, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal, round table 3 featured three panellists: Princess Maxima of the Netherlands, Special Advocate of the Secretary-General for Inclusive Finance for Development; Philippe Douste-Blazy, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Innovative Financing for Development; and Simon Scott, Head of the Statistics and Monitoring Division of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Presentations by the panellists

44. Princess Maxima of the Netherlands focused her presentation on the importance of universal access to the formal financial sector, including a full array of financial services, for people in developing countries, especially for those with low and uncertain income as they required more financial management to smooth their consumption. The challenge was to provide formal services that were as flexible and accessible to the poor as those currently provided by the informal sector. If successful, this would help to reduce income inequality, shrink the shadow economy and thus increase tax revenue in the countries. Financial sector development was key to development and evidence showed that "inclusiveness" led to an increase in investment and growth.

45 As an example of a successful public-private risk-sharing mechanism, the speaker mentioned a partnership between the Netherlands Development Finance Company, a development bank, and the Government of the Netherlands, which created a $400 million Government-financed fund, called "Massif". Active in 50 countries, Massif offered financing to participating financial intermediaries which, in turn, offered a variety of financial services, including savings accounts, credit, mortgages and insurance to millions of people. Thanks to the special partnership, Massif was able to take on the kinds of risks that were too high for development banks or commercial banks. The speaker suggested that more attention should be paid to financing small and medium-sized enterprises, in a fashion similar to traditional microfinance. She recalled that small and medium-sized enterprises were responsible for 70 per cent of job creation in the OECD countries. She also pointed out the need for a global association of small and medium-sized enterprises similar to the one for microfinance.

46. Mr. Douste-Blazy (Special Adviser to the Secretary-General) spoke about the potential of innovative financing for development, which goes beyond traditional ODA in mobilizing a fraction of global resources, especially in view of the

shortfalls in meeting ODA targets and the demand for resources in response to new and emerging needs, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation and food security. He highlighted the achievement of UNITAID through the airline solidarity tax and called attention to the work of the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development. He suggested that the United Nations should play a key role in this area and encouraged the setting up of an intergovernmental group on innovative development finance.

47. The speaker also advocated the timely introduction of the financial transactions tax as a source of funding dedicated to development, with a potential to contribute to the fight against communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, child mortality, early deaths and malnutrition. The speaker was of the view that the time was right for a financial transactions tax for development as the Heads of Government of many countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Germany, various United States economic authorities, Nobel laureates and others had expressed their support for this initiative. According to the speaker, global public opinion was also demanding payback from financial speculators for losses that others, including the poor, were now bearing. He welcomed the setting up of the High-level Task Force on International Financial Transactions for Development by the Leading Group and looked forward to its forthcoming report.

48. At the outset of his presentation, Mr. Scott (OECD) pointed to the positive role played by the Monterrey Consensus in increasing ODA through the agreed target of 0.7 per cent of GNI, which served as a mobilizing force. ODA had increased by 35 per cent in real terms since 2004. Despite increases, there were shortfalls in meeting ODA commitments by seven Development Assistance Committee countries. Given the past performance of donor countries and current fiscal pressures, OECD now predicted a $17 billion shortfall in 2010 ($13 billion shortfall to Africa) in reaching the 2005 commitments. The speaker was of the view that realistic adjustments to the targets might be needed to sustain momentum and credibility.

49. Fulfilling commitments to ODA targets required medium-term planning by donor countries. Experience had shown that those donor countries that met their targets had medium-term budgetary plans in place for aid targets. The speaker was of the view that all donors needed to establish clear and realistic medium-term spending targets for aid, and to meet them with year-by-year increases. This would allow developing countries to plan their budgets in advance on the basis of a realistic expectation of their aid inflows.

Discussion

50. During the interactive discussion that followed, there was a broad-based agreement that, in view of ODA shortfalls, it was particularly important for all stakeholders to make efforts to increase aid effectiveness in accordance with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Some participants called for enhanced partnership with the private sector and civil society to make aid more effective and to transfer knowledge and skills to recipient countries and organizations involved in capacity development in the field. On the emergence of non-traditional donors, a call was made for outreach to collect reliable and uniform statistics on their aid contributions. OECD was already providing technical assistance to some non-OECD emerging donors in order to build their capacity to report their aid statistics in conformity with international standards.

51. Mobilization of domestic resources was another area that should be advanced, in addition to better coordination of bilateral and multilateral aid efforts. This included universal access to finance, which was critical for inclusive development but might present a challenge in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. The importance of developing financial infrastructure at the national level for promoting inclusive finance was emphasized, in order to tap into the potential of savings for channelling resources into the productive capacities of developing countries.

52. Many speakers expressed support for innovative financing mechanisms which would complement ODA and secure additional and sustainable funding to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by tackling specific problems, such as illicit capital flows and tax evasion. Some expressed the view that the mechanisms, which proved to be successful in health sector, should be applied to climate change finance, especially in view of the target for 2020 adopted at Copenhagen. It was pointed out that the major sources of finance in this area were private investments, with the focus on adaptation of technology within existing projects rather than on developing new technology. The suggestion was made that the future contributions received by UNITAID could be split between health and climate change.

53. Some delegations expressed their concerns that setting up systems for innovative sources of finance in parallel to ODA might hamper aid effectiveness and burden developing countries. With respect to new mechanisms, a view was expressed that they should be cost-effective, result-oriented and funded by voluntary contributions chiefly from the private sector. Moreover, the focus should be on the improvement of existing mechanisms. A few delegations expressed their reluctance to support the introduction of non-voluntary schemes, such as an airline solidarity tax, in view of the potential negative impact on certain economic areas (for example, tourism, the airline industry and the financial sector), especially during an economically difficult time. In response, one speaker recalled the experience of the airline solidarity tax, which had not curbed the demand for air tickets, and had no adverse impact on tourism in developing countries because the amount of tax was very small and it was imposed on passengers from developed countries.

54. One specific initiative that attracted considerable attention was the proposed tax on financial transactions. A report on this issue was expected to be discussed in the European Union. The discussions would also include other instruments of innovative financing. Some participants expressed the view that the United Nations should play a greater role in this area and supported the idea that a United Nations intergovernmental group on innovative financing be established. A call was made to organize, in preparation for the September summit on the Millennium Development Goals, an informal event on the potential of voluntary innovative sources of development finance, as mandated by the General Assembly in resolution 64/193.

VI. Informal interactive dialogue: the link between financing for development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals — the road to the 2010 high-level event

55. Following the opening remarks by the Vice-President of the General Assembly, the informal interactive dialogue featured two presentations, by Zia Qureshi, Senior Adviser in the Office of the Chief Economist of the World Bank; and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

Presentations

56. Mr. Qureshi (World Bank) emphasized that the recent economic crisis provided an opportunity for fresh thinking on international economic cooperation between developed and developing countries. This new type of cooperation should be based on mutual benefits and harness the increased levels of South-South cooperation. The restoration of conditions for strong and sustainable economic growth required cooperation across all categories of countries. While the acute phase of the economic and financial crisis seemed to be over, many challenges remained to secure the recovery and restore solid growth, such as designing appropriate exit strategies from stimulus packages and implementing financial sector and other structural reforms. Whereas policy responses in China and India allowed them to recover swiftly, substantial slack remained in most middle-income countries. The speaker stressed that low-income countries were initially less affected because they were less integrated into the international financial system, but as the crisis spread and deepened the impact had been significant, through the reduction of export volumes, remittances, tourism, commodity prices, terms of trade, FDI and other capital flows. The development consequences of the crisis were likely to be severe and long lasting and the outlook for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals had worsened.

57. Consequently, more support for developing countries was needed. Financial assistance should not be seen as a handout, but rather as an investment in strong, sustainable and balanced global growth, which would benefit the world economy. To this end, the speaker called for more investment in the developing world by high-income and surplus reserve-rich countries, as well as more South-South investment by countries like China. More lending from the multilateral developing banks, accelerated delivery on ODA commitments, innovative financing modalities, including public-private partnerships to fund key global public goods and development-linked global programmes, as well as significant carbon-related resource flows to developing countries, would help to provide much-needed funds for development. Moreover, multilateral and bilateral insurance schemes to mitigate the risks of long-term private investors, stronger international financial safety nets to reduce the demand for reserves for self-insurance purposes, resistance to protectionist measures and support to the global trade agenda, as well as continued progress in economic reforms in developing countries, would help to release additional resources for sustained economic growth and poverty eradication.

58. Mr. Jomo (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) discussed the challenges ahead in the context of the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development. In reference to

mobilization of domestic resources, he mentioned that several myths pervasive in recent years had been dispelled by the recent crisis. Experience had shown that the savings rate followed rather than led the investment rate and that development would lead to improved governance, and not necessarily vice versa. The speaker highlighted the significant loss of fiscal revenues due to inadequate international tax cooperation and emphasized that, overall, net capital flows had gone from the South to the North. Moreover, over the years, the costs of financial transactions had not been significantly reduced, while instability and volatility had increased. The speaker highlighted the fact that FDI often followed and did not typically lead domestic investment. In recent years, there had been a decline in FDI, particularly in developing countries. Furthermore, most FDI had been "brown field", which merely acquired existing production facilities, and not "green field" investment, creating new economic capacities and jobs. In the least developed countries, FDI was not creating sustainable growth as it had been geared mainly towards mineral exploitation, with few linkages to the rest of the domestic economy. Regarding trade, the speaker stressed the deterioration in the terms of trade of both primary commodities and manufactured goods from developing countries. Aid for trade should provide compensation for the loss of revenue and of productive and export capacity due to trade liberalization besides financing new productive and export capacities.

59. With respect to aid, he mentioned that, while some claim no positive relationship between aid and economic growth or development, there is a clear positive link if politically driven aid is excluded. Innovative sources of financing, like taxes on financial or currency transactions, as well as aid for trade and finance for climate change adaptation, could provide important additional resources for development. The speaker emphasized that national ownership and policy space are critical for increased aid effectiveness. With regard to debt, not only least developed countries, but also transition economies and some developed countries had experienced major problems recently despite significant progress in recent years. Future sovereign debt crises were likely to occur and a new equitable and inclusive debt sustainability framework with a debt arbitration tribunal and debt workout facilitation are needed to address them. The concept of a robust debt restructuring mechanism should be revisited. The United Nations, as the most inclusive and legitimate forum, should also lead efforts to improve the coherence and consistency of the international financial system in support of development. The reform efforts need to address the democratic deficit in international financial institutions and tackle financial and monetary regulatory issues. The speaker underlined significant points of recent convergence between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions in their responses to the world financial and economic crisis. The international community should seize on those shared policy views to promote closer multilateral cooperation. Moreover, there is an urgent need to expand and strengthen the global partnership for development for all stakeholders, as called for in Millennium Development Goal 8.

Discussion

60. During the discussion that followed, there was broad consensus that achieving the Millennium Development Goals required the scaling up of action on the part of both developing and developed countries. Goal 8, on a global partnership for development, was based on the principles enshrined in the Monterrey Consensus

and reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development. Speakers emphasized that the global partnership provided the foundation for the achievement of all Millennium Development Goals. Its implementation called for a concerted and sustained effort on the part of all relevant stakeholders, including Member States, institutional stakeholders, civil society and the business sector. In particular, the cooperation between the United Nations and the international financial institutions, including the Bretton Woods institutions, should be improved. Member States emphasized the need to explore ways to strengthen the financing for development follow-up process in the interest of meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

61. Many speakers noted that the recent world fuel, energy, financial and economic crises had led to lower incomes and higher unemployment in developing countries as a result of drops in external flows, lower export revenues and decreases in remittances. This threatened the hard-won and uneven gains made in the fields of poverty reduction, health and education. To counteract the negative impact of the crises, especially in countries with special financing needs, meeting the targets of Goal 8 was crucial. The international community should deliver on its ODA commitments, enhance aid effectiveness and reduce conditionalities. It was noted that the quality of statistics needed to be improved to make aid more effective, particularly for countries with special needs. Innovative sources of finance had shown their effectiveness in providing additional resources for the realization of the Millennium Development Goals and should be promoted and explored further.

62. Several speakers emphasized that the international community needed to galvanize efforts to progress on those goals falling far short of agreed targets, especially the reduction of maternal mortality, as well as the promotion of gender equality and environmental sustainability. They pointed out that mechanisms to lower pharmaceutical prices had the potential to advance health targets, while enhanced access to technology could provide powerful tools to deal with climate change and increase agricultural productivity. While the importance of focusing development aid and other financial flows on achieving the Millennium Development Goals was generally recognized, some speakers also highlighted the need to follow longer-term development policies that reach beyond the Millennium Development Goals.

63. Many participants called for fulfilling the development promise of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, increasing aid for trade to compensate for loss of tariff revenues and resisting protectionism, as well as extending measures to achieve the debt sustainability of developing countries. Some speakers also highlighted the importance of the private sector in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and called for the creation of an enabling environment for business investment.

64. It was stated that good governance at all levels was crucial for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. Domestically, developing countries should continue to implement national development strategies aimed at poverty reduction, job creation and sustained economic growth. In this regard, it was crucial to provide them sufficient policy space. At the international level, the recent world financial and economic crisis had highlighted the need for comprehensive reform towards a more equitable, coherent, participatory and development-oriented international financial architecture.

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General and complete disarmament

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 64/42 of 2 December 2009, on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, the General Assembly, convinced that conventional arms control needed to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arose mainly among States located in the same region or subregion, decided to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 5 March 2010, the Secretariat sent a note verbale to Member States requesting their views on the subject. As of the writing of the present report, nine replies have been received from the following States: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Greece, Lebanon, Mexico, Panama, Serbia and Ukraine. The replies are reproduced in section II below. Subsequent replies will be issued as addenda.

II. Replies received from Member States

Armenia

[Original: English]
[27 April 2010]

General Assembly resolution 64/42 provides an excellent opportunity to speak about challenges focusing, in particular on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, leading a discussion of the best ways to deal with key ongoing developments on the issue.

Armenia therefore values its cooperation with the relevant international organizations, first of all within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose institutions and executive structures are important pillars for regional security cooperation and confidence-building measures, as well as for regional arms control.

1. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The main OSCE arms control, disarmament and security cooperation institutions are the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). The Joint Consultative Group is also a part of OSCE, but acts only within the member States of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

FSC includes the Vienna Document of 1999, the Code of Conduct, the Global Exchange of Military Information, as well as issues relating to anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, national practices on the brokering and control of armaments, export control, and so on. All of them envisage annual exchanges of relevant information, and, in the case of the Vienna Document, there are also inspections and evaluation visits. For example, every year Armenia receives three designated-area inspections along with one evaluation visit.

The OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, the OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the OSCE Meeting to Review the Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons are main and basic issues of OSCE-CPC/FSC. They are major tools for reflection on and evaluation of the implementation of the OSCE confidence- and security-building measures.

2. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The CFE Treaty is one of the main arms control arrangements which is aimed at minimizing concerns and challenges and at the same time strengthening confidence, openness and security between the participating States. Armenia understands the CFE Treaty as one of the cornerstones of European stability and security. Since 1992, the Treaty has proved that it is a major tool for the creation of common regional trust and confidence.

Like other OSCE arms control regimes, the Treaty requires annual and current exchanges of military information, as well as verification, arms reduction and inspections. According to the number of passive quota, usually four inspections (including multinationals) of the Armenian Armed Forces are conducted by other member States each year.

In this respect it should be mentioned that Armenia is also active in this field. Thus, it used once of its active quotas and successfully conducted an inspection of the Turkish Armed Forces last years.

3. Violation of the CFE Treaty by Azerbaijan

At the beginning of 2010, the Republic of Azerbaijan once again demonstrated its attitude and "manner" towards the implementation of international agreements. According to the regular annual CFE exchange of information, the Republic of Azerbaijan, as had already happened in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, officially declared that it was over quoted in two out of five categories of Treaty-limited Equipments: 161 battle tanks and 140 artillery systems more.

That case was continuously followed by the Armenian side within OSCE, as well as in other international organizations, from 2006 to 2009. The permanent delegation of Armenia to OSCE raised the fact of Azerbaijan's violation of the international agreement. The case was condemned by several other delegations (Germany, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, France, etc.) during the Joint Consultative Group and OSCE regular and annual meetings.

The issue of the violation was also criticized within the United Nations, NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization; Azerbaijan was considered as a rough neglector of its legal obligations under the International Treaty.

At the same time, the Azerbaijani side has since 2006 responded that its armed forces were in a modernization process and that reductions would follow. Despite this fact, however, Azerbaijan has not taken any steps to reduce or decommission the excessive Treaty-Limited Equipment in recent years.

Another explanation given by Azerbaijan is the force majeure situation as a more general political picture, which refers to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

In this respect, it has been mentioned several times by the Armenian side that the CFE Treaty is a legally binding document with concrete tasks, provisions and

principles aimed at stability, predictability, military balance and transparency in our common security framework. Therefore, any double talk, political argumentation or justifications brought from elsewhere are not appropriate in this context. The implementation of the international Treaty does not have any common sense with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue: the latter is the theme of discussions within the OSCE Minsk Group framework.

In this respect a good reminder of the experience of August 2008 with the Georgia-South Ossetia-Abkhazia situation showed that the uncontrolled arms race and force demonstration are non-perspective, very dangerous and full of unpredictable developments with respect to regional security.

Moreover, during the last OSCE Ministerial meeting, held in Athens in December 2009, Azerbaijan, along with Armenia and the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, signed the Ministerial Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, and confirmed itself "to finalize the basic principles on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, based on the Madrid document, in order to begin drafting a comprehensive peace agreement in good faith and without delay".

Armenia will continue to follow up the Azerbaijani 2010 Treaty violation case. Armenia once again confirms its readiness to implement its international obligations under the CFE Treaty and renews its commitment to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue within the OSCE Minsk Group.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Original: English]
[13 April 2010]

Agreement on subregional arms control

Guided by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization, article IV, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control in Vienna on 4 January 1996.

The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control establishes new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region.

The Agreement is based on the same guidelines and principles as the CFE Treaty. Four countries are involved on its implementation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia. Thanks to this Agreement, the southern European region has set an example as far as arms control and disarmament in a post-conflict situation are concerned. A high level of cooperation was achieved in the area, and today the parties are continuing to work in a common effort to further strengthen stability, transparency and confidence. More than 9,000 items of heavy weaponry have been reduced so far.

Treaty on Open Skies

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to the Treaty on Open Skies, which establishes a programme of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of their size, a major role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them and is one of the most wide-ranging international efforts to date promoting the openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

Vienna Document 1999

Bosnia and Herzegovina also participates in other conventional arms-control agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the Vienna Document 1999 of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, which is designed to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency. Its provisions regarding the exchange and verification of military information on participating States' armed forces, their defence policies and military activities, including the size of defence budgets, the location, size and strength of military units and formations, the exchange of annual calendars and prior notification of certain military activities, as well as observation of certain military activities, increase transparency and confidence by promoting broader and more comprehensive cooperation among States at the regional and subregional levels.

Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a number of important challenges related to arms control at the present time. According to recent research, a significant proportion of Bosnians possess firearms, many of which (perhaps three quarters) are unregistered. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina is obviously of significant concern, given their destabilizing potential. Further, organized crime remains a problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina and poses a threat to both the rule of law and to human security.

The independent studies conducted in 2004 indicate that over 8,000 people have died as a result of the misuse of weapons since the end of the war in 1995. According to UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina media reporting in 2007 and 2008, a total of 455 weapons-related incidents occurred within a mortality index of more than 26 per cent. In the first four months of 2009 alone, a total of 22 armed robberies were reported.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has, jointly with UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initiated projects targeting the reduction of the uncontrolled presence of small arms and light weapons and ammunition and improvement of the control and coordination mechanisms. In addition, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Coordination Board has developed and is implementing a National Strategy and Action Plan for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control that set outs the needs, activities, measures and responsible parties for the implementation of the Strategy.

To this end, UNDP and the Coordination Board developed and launched the Small Arms Control programme, which works towards addressing these challenges through:

(a) Enhancing the institutional capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to reduce and control small arms and light weapons and ammunition in Bosnia and

Herzegovina through better informed policymakers and support for the National Coordination Board and the implementation of the National Strategy for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(b) Destruction of surplus and seized weapons;

(c) Disposal of ammunition through the upgrading of national capacities.

Burkina Faso

[Original: French]
[15 June 2010]

Conventional arms control requires the rigorous management of national stockpiles of weapons involving:

- Regular reviews in which stocks are "purified" through the destruction of obsolete and decommissioned weapons;
- The periodic destruction of decommissioned munitions.

Such operations, which are already in place in Burkina Faso, could be given a formal structure through the establishment of a legally binding peer control system at the regional level. This system would reinforce existing subregional agreements, such as the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, drawn up by the Economic Community of West African States and in force since September 2009, of which Burkina Faso is a signatory.

Greece

[Original: English]
[3 May 2010]

Confidence- and security-building measures in the field of conventional arms

1. Confidence- and security-building measures refer to a series of measures that are designed to render greater transparency and prediction capability for military issues, for the concerned States to adapt.

2. Greece fully participates in the creation of stability, security and cooperation structures among the member nations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the aim of enhancing the regional security institutions and eliminating the tensions in the areas concerned.

3. Greece attributes special importance to the role that OSCE is called to play in the international security environment and participates in all initiatives aimed at enhancing OSCE strength and at employing its capabilities in crisis prevention and management.

4. Motivated by the fundamental need to promote and ensure confidence and security in the OSCE area of application, in order to avoid the occurrence of threats or violence in the international environment, our country steadily supports the initiatives of the aforementioned organization, implementing the following confidence- and security-building measures in the field of controlled arms.

A. Vienna Document 1999

According to the provisions of the above document, our country applies, on an annual basis, the following measures:

(a) The exchange of military information and the changes to the structure and organization of the armed forces units;

(b) The exchange of the defence planning text regarding the defence policy, the military strategy and the military doctrine, along with the armed forces procurement and armaments expenditure;

(c) Military contacts with other OSCE member States through visits to airbases and military facilities. Greece organized in 2004 a visit to an airbase and military facility;

(d) The former eastern countries military unit evaluations, based on NATO coordination and bilateral military cooperation, mainly with the Balkan countries. Greece also receives passive evaluations and inspections. For the year 2009, one inspection to Sweden was conducted. The Russian Federation conducted one inspection and one evaluation visit to Greece;

(e) The prior notification of certain military activities (>9000 troops, or >250 BT etc.) and constraining provisions for military activities.

B. Global Exchange of Military Information

Our country annually exchanges with the rest of the OSCE member States general military information concerning the conventional forces in formation level (personnel and seven types of weapons systems of the Army, Navy and Air Force such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and submarines).

C. Dayton Agreement (Annex 1-B, article IV)

Even though our country is not a co-signatory member of the Dayton Agreement, it participates annually, under OSCE auspices, with military inspectors — escorts — in the multinational teams composed to this end in order to assist the implementation of article IV of the Dayton Agreement, Annex 1-B).

D. Conventional arms transfers

(a) Based on General Assembly resolution 46/36 and OSCE FSC.DEC 13/97, import-export data for the previous year of seven types of main weapon systems (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and submarines) are available annually along with data on existing weapons systems and holdings. Man-portable air defence systems are also included;

(b) Additionally, as a result of FSC.DEC 20/95, there is an annual data exchange on the policy of conventional arms transfers.

E. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

(a) The Code of Conduct covers the politico-military aspects of armed forces personnel of OSCE member States, based on international and humanitarian law;

(b) According to FSC.DEC 1/09, information concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Code of Conduct is exchanged annually, as provided for by an adopted questionnaire.

F. Small arms and light weapons

In the field of small arms and light weapons, during the previous year, our country exchanged information on exports to and imports from other participating States.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[21 May 2010]

Subject: Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The Ministry of National Defence affirms the following principles:

- Full compliance with resolutions of international legitimacy adopted by the United Nations and respect for the Charter in regard to this matter;
- Priority focus on the resolution of international disputes, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict;
- The equality of States in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevention of an arms race, and confidence-building;
- An undertaking by all concerned regional States to remain compliant with a view to precluding any repetition of the double standards applied in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the need to hold States accountable in the event of non-compliance;
- Control of the manufacture and transfer of arms and suppression of the smuggling of and illicit trafficking in arms, in order to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of terrorists;
- The enactment of legislation at the regional and international levels to limit the proliferation of such weapons, while allowing for the possibility of their individual or collective use to resist occupation or defend territory;
- The strengthening of multilateralism as a means of furthering negotiation on arms regulation and disarmament.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[14 May 2010]

In response to note ODA/21-2010/CAC, from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Government of Mexico hereby submits the following opinion with respect to resolution 64/42, on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2009.

Mexico is of the view that conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels is a fundamental factor in confidence-building and the prevention of conflicts between States.

In the context of conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, Mexico has always acted in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States by promoting the implementation of confidence-building measures and compliance with the obligations intended to implement them as a means of encouraging transparency and the exchange of information in the region.

As regards the implementation of arms control measures, Mexico proposes that:

(a) Regional and subregional agreements for the harmonization of the marking systems of the various arms and ammunition manufacturing companies should be promoted;

(b) States should take the necessary steps to expedite procedures for dealing with requests for cooperation in the tracing of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and

(c) A body responsible for ensuring effective conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels should be established under the Office for Disarmament Affairs in accordance with the budget approved for that Office.

Action at the national level

With regard to measures for transparency in the acquisition, development and deployment of conventional and strategic weapons, Mexico provides information annually to the United Nations for inclusion in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to the Organization of American States under the standardized international reporting system on military expenditure. Such reporting helps to strengthen confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.

The Ministry of Defence, in coordination with the state and municipal governments, periodically carries out arms-in-exchange-for-payment campaigns aimed at reducing the number of weapons in the hands of civilians and thereby facilitating the implementation of arms control measures within the country.

The Ministry of Defence is also responsible for the strict control, custody and marking — for purposes of identification — of weapons decommissioned by the Government of Mexico. Such weapons are then disposed of or destroyed, provided that they are not the subject of any criminal investigation. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence has implemented rigorous procedures for the management of police-

issue weapons whereby justifications for specific weapons are subject to analysis, verification and validation prior to approval.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[23 June 2010]

The Republic of Panama believes that this initiative, intended to promote the conclusion of regional arms control agreements, should be supported, since the existence of bilateral and regional legal instruments that establish guidelines for the import and export of armaments would reduce the risks of proliferation and illegal transfer by helping States to distinguish between licit trade and illicit traffic.

Serbia

[Original: English]
[28 April 2010]

The Republic of Serbia consistently implements the provisions of international agreements in the field of arms control and abides by its relevant commitments.

The regional level

Pursuant to chapter X of the Vienna Document 1999 (Regional Measures), the Government of Serbia has signed with the Government of Hungary a bilateral agreement on confidence- and security-building measures complementing the Vienna Document 1999.

On the same basis, the Ministry of Defence of Serbia signed with the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria the Protocol on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures implementing the Vienna Document 1999.

Furthermore, pursuant to chapter X of the Vienna Document 1999 (Regional Measures), and under the Final Document on the Negotiations Related to Article IV, Annex 1-B, of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Verification Centre of the Ministry of Defence of Serbia and the Verification Centre of the Bundeswehr have signed the letter of intent providing for additional activities in the field of arms control.

The subregional level

Under the Final Document on the Negotiations Related to Article IV, Annex 1-B, of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Agreement on Subregional Arms Control), Serbia accepts each year the specified number of inspections of the parties to the Agreement, as well as the arms reduction inspections. At the same time, Serbia conducts, through the Verification Centre of the Ministry of Defence, the specified number of inspections of the parties to the Agreement.

Serbia renders an important contribution to conventional arms control at the subregional level through its active participation in the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control. The implementation of the provisions of this Agreement has proved

itself an effective instrument for achieving a balanced and stable level of defence forces with the lowest quantities of weapons needed for the defence of the parties as an essential element for establishing peace and security as well as for confidence-building.

Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[19 May 2010]

General Assembly resolution 64/42 "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels"

One of the main areas of work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2010 is to ensure the strict implementation by the State of international obligations in the military sphere and increase cooperation with all partners and neighbours.

The armed forces of Ukraine are participating actively in conventional arms control processes, specifically:

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;

The 1999 Vienna document of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, and also the bilateral agreements on additional confidence- and security-building measures formulated on its basis and signed with neighbouring States (the Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Belarus);

The Treaty on Open Skies;

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention);

The documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) regulating the approach to small arms and light weapons.

The active conduct of joint monitoring efforts, both in the territory of Ukraine and beyond its borders, is making a significant contribution to transparency in this regard.

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Relationship between disarmament and development

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/32. It discusses recent trends in the further strengthening within the United Nations of the relationship between disarmament and development. In addition, the report contains information received from Governments on the subject.

* A/65/150.

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I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 64/32, the Assembly stressed the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship and requested the Secretary-General to strengthen the role of the Organization in this field. In paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.[1] In paragraph 7 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report at its sixty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. Furthermore, in paragraph 6 of the resolution, the General Assembly reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

3. Pursuant to that request, on 5 March 2010, the Secretariat sent out a note verbale to Member States seeking their views. As of the writing of the present report, replies have been received from the following States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cuba, Lebanon, Mexico, Panama, Serbia and Ukraine. This information is contained in section III below.

II. Strengthening further the role of the United Nations in the disarmament-development relationship

4. The issue of disarmament and development has long figured on the agenda of the United Nations. Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations entrusts the Security Council with formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments that would "promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". The issue was discussed extensively at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978,[2] and the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development took place in 1987. Related General Assembly resolutions on disarmament and development have been tabled since 1978.

5. Since 1981, under a related process, Member States have been providing information on their military spending through the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. Under this instrument, Governments are called upon to report annually to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. The United Nations publishes and circulates this information. Thus far, more than 120 Member States have reported to this instrument at least once. Significantly, for the first time since the instrument's inception, the General Assembly, by its resolution 62/13, requested the Secretary-

[1] United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

[2] See General Assembly resolution S-10/2.

General to establish a group of governmental experts, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to review the operation and further development of the instrument commencing in 2010 and to transmit the report of the group of experts to the General Assembly for its consideration at its sixty-sixth session.

6. In 2003 and 2004, a Group of Governmental Experts conducted an in-depth examination of the relationship between disarmament and development and produced a comprehensive report (A/59/119). This report provided "a reappraisal of the disarmament-development relationship and the role of the Organization in this connection, taking into account all the major international changes that have taken place since the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987". Notably, the report called for mainstreaming the disarmament-development relationship into the ongoing work of the Organization.

7. Insofar as the issue of disarmament and development is discussed as a trade-off between the level of military expenditures and the level of economic development in a country, no consensus has been reached among Member States. Some States are of the view that these two issues are directly interrelated, while others perceive this nexus as being more complex.

8. There have been a number of initiatives and programmes, within the United Nations and outside of it, which take into account the linkage between disarmament, arms regulation and development, and which therefore represent forms of mainstreaming the topic in existing or emerging frameworks. Such initiatives and programmes were fuelled by the acknowledgement of world leaders in 2005 that "development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing".[3] They illustrate that the relationship between disarmament and development is a highly topical one when dealt with in the context of specific themes or processes. Such approaches may examine the destabilizing influence that armed violence, poor controls over the trade in arms and ammunition, illicit drug trafficking, weak and corrupt institutions, the lack of good governance and other factors exert on social and economic development, particularly in conflict-prone areas. The related issue of excessive military expenditure diverting resources from attainment of the Millennium Development Goals has also been identified as a cause for persistent underdevelopment. Other obstacles for development include the contamination of areas such as roads, fields, wells and orchards with landmines and unexploded submunitions from cluster bombs. The report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/64/153) submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session, gave an overview of recent developments in this regard.

9. In paragraph 9 of the report it is mentioned that, as far as the internal coordination within the Organization on these issues is concerned, the main existing mechanisms for coordination within the United Nations are the United Nations Mine Action Team, the Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism, and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, which aim at ensuring that the relationship between disarmament and development is covered effectively in their respective areas through involvement of all relevant actors from within the United Nations system.

[3] General Assembly resolution 60/1.

Recent developments

10. On the issue of armed violence, 61 States adopted on 12 May 2010 the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence.[4] This document commits States to a number of practical measures designed to reduce the incidence and impact of armed violence by 2015. These include a commitment to monitor the incidence and impact of armed violence; the recognition of the rights of victims; the promotion and integration of armed violence prevention into local, national and international development plans; increased international cooperation and assistance for armed violence prevention; and the call for the General Assembly high-level plenary meeting on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2010 to discuss armed violence in the context of the Millennium Development Goals. The Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence followed the report of the Secretary-General on promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence (A/64/228), in which the Secretary-General called for greater international action on the issue, as well as the development of goals, targets and indicators for prevention and reduction.

11. In the field of small arms, the United Nations Fourth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York from 14 to 18 June 2010. An implicit reference to the relation between disarmament and development in the meeting's outcome document was made as much as it relates to assistance and cooperation (see A/CONF.192/BMS/2010/3). The implementation of the Programme of Action will be further examined by an open-ended meeting of governmental experts in 2011, which is mandated to address key implementation challenges and opportunities, including international cooperation and assistance, and at its review conference scheduled in 2012.

12. The ongoing discussion within the context of the United Nations on an arms trade treaty seeks to address irresponsible transfers of conventional arms, and the serious negative impact that such transfers may have on security, development and human rights. The Preparatory Committee meetings for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, which are scheduled in 2010 and 2011, are expected to serve as useful forums to further discuss and develop this topic.

13. In the field of mine action, the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-free World (30 November-4 December 2009) came to a successful conclusion. Its political declaration underlined the humanitarian accomplishment in the implementation of the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention and its contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, as well as the will to ensure the full and effective participation and inclusion of mine victims in the social, cultural, economic and political life of their communities. The Cartagena Action Plan, another outcome of the Summit, also highlights the commitment of States parties to continue to promote the inclusion of mine action activities in ongoing development programmes and the identification of mine action as a priority in local, national and international development actions.

14. The Convention on Cluster Munitions, in which States parties expressed their concern for the fact that cluster munition remnants "kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through

[4] See www.osloconferencearmedviolence.no.

the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use", obtained its thirtieth ratification on 16 February 2010 and will enter into force, accordingly, on 1 August 2010.

III. Information received from Governments

Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Original: English]
[13 April 2010]

Agreement on Subregional Arms Control

1. Guided by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilizations, Article IV, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control in Vienna on 4 January 1996.

2. The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control established new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region.

3. The Agreement is based on the same guidelines and principles as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Four countries are involved in its implementation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia. Thanks to this Agreement, the southern European region has set an example as far as arms control and disarmament in a post-conflict situation are concerned. A high level of cooperation has been achieved in the area and today the Parties continue to work on a common effort to further strengthen stability, transparency and confidence. More than 9,000 items of heavy weapon have been reduced so far.

Treaty on Open Skies

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to the Treaty on Open Skies, which established a programme of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of their size, a major role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them and is one of the most wide-ranging international efforts to date promoting openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

Vienna Document 1999

5. Bosnia and Herzegovina also participates in other conventional arms-control agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the Vienna Document 1999 of the negotiations on

confidence and security-building measures, which is designed to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency. Its provisions regarding the exchange and verification of military information on participating States' armed forces, their defence policies and military activities, including the size of defence budgets, the location, size and strength of military units and formations, the exchange of annual calendars and prior notification of certain military activities, as well as observation of certain military activities, increase transparency and confidence by promoting broader and more comprehensive cooperation among States on the regional and subregional levels.

6. Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a number of important challenges related to arms control at the present time. According to recent research, a significant proportion of Bosnians possess firearms, many of which (perhaps three quarters) are unregistered. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina is obviously of significant concern, given their destabilizing potential. Further, organized crime remains a problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina and poses a threat to both the rule of law and human security.

7. The independent studies conducted in 2004 indicate that over 8,000 people have died as a result of the misuse of weapons since the end of the war in 1995. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Bosnia and Herzegovina media reporting of 2007 and 2008 a total of 455 weapons-related incidents have occurred with over 26 per cent of mortality index. In just the first four months of 2009 a total of 22 armed robberies were reported.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has jointly, with UNDP initiated the projects targeting reduction of uncontrolled presence of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, improvement of the control and coordination mechanisms. In addition, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Coordination Board developed and is implementing the National Strategy and Action Plan for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control that sets out the needs, activities, measures and responsible parties for the implementation of the Strategy.

8. To this end, UNDP and the Coordination Board developed and launched the small arms control programme, which works towards addressing these challenges through:

(1) Enhancing the institutional capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to reduce and control small arms and light weapons and ammunition in Bosnia and Herzegovina through better informed policymakers and support to the National Coordination Board and the implementation of the National Strategy for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(2) Destruction of surplus and seized weapons;

(3) Disposal of ammunition through upgrade of national capacities.

Brazil

[Original: English]
[22 June 2010]

1. Brazil is a party to all major multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. Each year, as a means to promote openness and transparency, Brazil submits its reports to the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Brazil also fosters confidence-building measures within its region, such as the recent establishment of a South American defence council, with the aim of consolidating South America as a zone of peace, and a base for democratic stability and comprehensive development of the peoples, and as a contribution to world peace.

2. At the same time, at the international level, Brazil regrets that, more than three decades after the tenth special session of the General Assembly, no significant progress has been made with regard to general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, arguments continue to be used in order to justify the possession of nuclear arms, even though they are of no use to address the security threats of a post-cold war world, such as terrorism, transnational crime and internal conflicts. Brazil is of the view that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all States, including of those who possess them.

3. Recognizing the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the crucial role of security in this connection, Brazil believes that those considerable resources devoted by some States to maintaining and developing their nuclear-weapons capabilities could be geared towards the promotion of economic and social development throughout the world. In a world in transition, Brazil considers that political will is necessary to address and correct those situations that work against peace and prosperity, above all the anachronism posed by nuclear weapons.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[17 May 2010]

1. The growing and alarming arms race, the cost of which now exceeds one trillion dollars, is absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources, placing a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and affecting the international flow of trade, finance and technology.

2. The global economy is currently deeply mired in one of the most severe financial crises since the beginning of the past century, particularly in developing countries. Nevertheless, military expenditures increased by 45 per cent in the last decade and, far from decreasing, continue to grow at an alarming rate. The United States of America alone, the world's largest investor in arms, accounted for 58 per cent of the total increase in global expenditure during this period.

3. The armed forces are major consumers of a large variety of non-renewable resources and reserves, both of energy and of raw materials. It is clear that the major

military powers consume the most raw materials for military purposes, even more than they consume resources in general.

4. Military and related activities absorb a large proportion of the scientific and technological potential. It is estimated that some 25 per cent of the world's scientists are currently involved in military-related activities. It has been calculated that approximately 40 per cent of total research and development spending since the Second World War has been used for military purposes.

5. The economic consequences of military expenditures for the developing countries are even more negative than for the most developed countries. For every dollar spent on arms in developing countries, it has been established that domestic investment decreases by 25 cents. Imports of arms exacerbate the trade deficit of developing countries and account for almost 50 per cent of the trade deficit in some third world countries.

6. Since 1960, rich countries have spent at least 15 trillion dollars on the manufacture of weapons (approximately 334 billion dollars annually); however, they have transferred only 2.6 trillion dollars in development assistance to poor countries (almost 58 billion dollars annually). In other words, rich countries have invested at least six times more in manufacturing weapons than they have disbursed in development assistance. At that rate, developing countries would have to wait 260 years (more than two and a half centuries) to receive development assistance equal to the amount wasted on military expenditures by industrialized countries in only 45 years (not even half a century).

7. Half of the resources invested in arms throughout the world in the last two years would have increased annual production over this period to a level higher than the gross domestic product of sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest region and the one with the slowest growth rate.

8. The United Nations has calculated that it would take only 80 billion dollars each year for a decade to overcome poverty, hunger, ill-health, lack of education and poor housing around the globe. Expenditure on arms is thus 180 times greater than spending to alleviate hunger, promote agricultural development and mitigate the economic situation that has arisen in recent months as a result of the rise in food prices.

9. The increase in military expenditures is a factor that suffices to create mistrust and legitimate international concern. We cannot stand idly by while global military spending continues to far exceed the funds allocated to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These problems must be addressed through urgent action.

10. Cuba reiterates its proposal to create a fund, administered by the United Nations, into which at least half of current military expenditure would be paid in order to meet the economic and social development requirements of poor countries. This initiative, apart from its obvious benefits, could have added value as a confidence-building measure and would be a crucial factor for the achievement of the MDGs.

11. Cuba also reiterates its support for the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in September 1987, which included an international commitment

to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for purposes of socio-economic development. Cuba also renews its support for discussion of this matter in the General Assembly and for implementation of the recommendations contained in the resolutions of the Assembly.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[10 May 2010]

1. Lebanon has always supported agreements related to disarmament in general and weapons of mass destruction in particular, because of the threat that such weapons pose to security and peace and the money that is spent on them, which, if diverted to various fields of development, could make an enormous contribution.

2. Lebanon suffers from armed conflict and is in need of any assistance that could alleviate that suffering. Notwithstanding the security and military circumstances which the country is experiencing, and the numerous operational concerns of the army along the borders and internally, pursuant to implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), action is being taken, using all the means available, towards economic and social development.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[29 April 2010]

1. Mexico believes that disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the international community today. Moreover, it is conscious that disarmament and development are independent, multidimensional and mutually reinforcing processes that are linked by the issue of security in all its aspects. It therefore supports initiatives promoting the effective fulfilment of disarmament and development commitments.

2. Mexico is strongly convinced that the effective fulfilment of international commitments arising from existing agreements on disarmament and arms control can help to counter the negative impact of excessive military spending on the world population's socio-economic development.

3. Mexico notes that the Secretary-General has invited Member States to provide information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries, and would like to provide the following information:

- In its public expenditure policy, the Mexican Government has directed most of its resources to social development;
- This year, the Government of Mexico will direct 96.7 per cent of the budgetary items initially intended for arms procurement to cover recurrent expenditures (personal services, the purchase of materials, operation and supplies); the

remaining 3.3 per cent will be directed to capital costs (personal and real property and construction);

- In the light of the above, the Government of Mexico has not currently earmarked resources for the acquisition of new arms.

4. It is also noteworthy that a significant amount of spending by the Mexican armed forces is allocated to social and humanitarian projects benefiting the public, such as medical care in marginalized rural areas, operations designed to protect the public from the impact of natural disasters and assistance related to the care and preservation of the environment, thereby helping to improve Mexico's economic and social environment.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[23 June 2010]

The Republic of Panama has incorporated into its domestic laws various multilateral treaties with these objectives, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Serbia

[Original: English]
[12 May 2010]

1. Serbia attaches great importance to the programmes of economic and social development funded by resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements, especially in the developing countries, as provided for in the provisions of General Assembly resolution 64/32, regarding the relationship between disarmament and development.

2. Arms and military equipment in the stockpiles of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbia, identified as surplus, are sold or, in the absence of a buyer, scrapped and destroyed under relevant technological procedures in facilities in which requisite capacities are available (TRZ, Kragujevac; Krusik, Valjevo and Prva iskra, Baric).

3. Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding and the implementing agreement concluded between the Ministry of Defence of then Serbia and Montenegro and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), the destruction of more than 1,400,000 anti-personnel mines was carried out in TRZ, Kragujevac, in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In addition, the destruction/demilitarization of 3,764 pieces of missile 9M32M "ARROW-2M" took place in Krusik, Valjevo, and was funded by the donation of the United States Department of State.

Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[19 May 2010]

1. The main objective of developing the Ukraine's armed forces is to establish a small, well-trained professional force with modern weapons and military equipment.

2. During the restructuring measures carried out in the period from 2000 to 2010, the Ukraine's armed forces decommissioned 3,192 conventional weapons and units of military equipment, namely:

1,172 battle tanks;

1,027 armoured combat vehicles;

504 artillery systems (with a calibre of 100 mm and above);

392 combat aircraft; and,

97 attack helicopters.

3. Over this period, troop levels in the Ukraine's armed forces decreased from 310,000 to 150, 000 military personnel.

4. An important priority for the development of the armed forces in 2010 is the disposal of surplus weapons, military equipment, ammunition and missile propellant components from arsenals, bases and warehouses which are scheduled to be dismantled in 2010 and 2011.

5. From 2006 to 2009, six missile and ammunition storage sites were dismantled at 16 arsenals, bases and warehouses of the armed forces scheduled for closure.

6. In 2009 alone, the Ministry of Defence disposed of 23,100 tonnes of ammunition from military units of the armed forces.

7. The Ukraine's armed forces have been actively involved in reducing the country's nuclear missile potential. All 222 deployed strategic offensive weapons have been eliminated (taking into account those transferred to the Russian Federation).

8. All strategic and tactical nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine have been dismantled and destroyed at nuclear power companies in the Russian Federation.

9. Work is continuing to transfer the territories of empty military bases to communal ownership or to place them under the management of other central Government authorities.

10. Demining activities at former military training grounds continue to be another high priority. To facilitate the clearance of explosive ordnance, the Government has approved the framework for a targeted State mine action programme for the period 2009 to 2014.

11. Surplus military equipment of the armed forces is sold in accordance with the current legislation, as established by clearly regulated procedure. Funds from the sale of surplus military equipment are directed to Government revenues and used exclusively for defence spending.